This severe recession has been accompanied by a dramatic slowing in the rate of inflation. Table 1 
One important question raised by this experience is whether the disinflation that has been accomplished is more than might have been predicted on the basis of historical experience or whether it is about what would have been expected along with the huge recession that has occurred. The answer to this question, in turn, should shed some light on theoretical issues concerning how the economy works and on the options confronting policymakers. In particular, a central issue to be considered in light of the experience of the past few years is whether the relation between output and inflation will remain the same when there has been a significant change in the policy regime, such as that which occurred in the fall of 1979.
Disinflation Policy and Inflation Models
One model of the inflation process, the wage norm hypothesis, explicitly distinguishes between the cyclical variation in inflation and an ongoing norm rate of wage increase around which the cyclical variation takes place. ' Cyclical variations in employment and inflation are jointly determined by the optimal response of firms to variations in the demand for their output. Although expectations can, in principle, alter the wage norm, in practice this hypothesis relates historical changes in the norm to experienced, rather than anticipated, changes in the economy.
In a wage norm equation, shifts in the norm, such as those that would arise from sustained episodes of inflation or economic slack, show up empirically as shifts in the constant term. The coefficients relating output and inflation in the short run are determined by institutional and behavioral characteristics that are largely unaffected by changes in macroeconomic policies or by changes in the wage norm itself. In empirical work, I have modeled historical norms as stable except for occasional discontinuous shifts.2 Because wage norms do not respond in a linear or systematic way to any one measure of economic performance-for instance, they would respond less to a large spurt in the CPI coming from supply shocks (1978-80) than to an equivalent increase in the CPI associated with a sustained period of very low unemployment (1966-69)-I preferred this procedure to more elaborate ways one might model norm shifts. It has provided an adequate, simple characterization of the past.
For the present episode, this model predicted that the policy aimed persistently at disinflation would eventually shift the wage norm downward, but only after imposing unusually great or sustained weakness in the real economy. Under these conditions, the wage norm equation would begin to exhibit forecast errors indicating that wage norms were shifting downward.
Most empirical studies of wage or price inflation have used past inflation rates, rather than the concept of wage norms, to help explain current inflation. The effect of lagged inflation in these models has generally been interpreted as representing the influence of inflationary expectations on current inflation, where these expectations are formed by an adaptive process. In such models, developments affecting inflation continue to have an influence long after they occur. And the effect of a sustained shock affecting inflation grows with the passage of time. Because the lagged inflation terms directly embody long-run and expectational effects, a sustained macroeconomic policy change is not expected to alter either the constant term or the coefficients of the equation relating output and inflation. New classical models differ in important respects from either of the modelsjust described. They reject adaptive expectations as a description of how future price expectations are formed. Generally they relate these expectations to the policies that are anticipated, but that idea has never been implemented in a widely accepted way in a predictive equation. The problem is in determining what economic agents expect policy to be and what amount of inflation they think will accompany it. These models also hypothesize that markets always clear and that in doing so they incorporate expected future prices in an important way. In the pure form of such models, levels of output and employment deviate from full employment levels only because economic agents are mistaken about policy now and in the future. They interpret the very flat short-run Phillips curve estimated from historical data as a reflection of mistakes by economic agents resulting from unpredictable policies.
The central policy implication of this theory is that policy should be steady and predictable, a prescription usually interpreted as supporting monetarism. According to the theory, the mistakes of economic agents would be minimized under such a policy and the short-run relation between output and unemployment would become very steep. If the monetary policy change of 1979 was understood as a change to a steadier and more disinflationary policy regime, this theory predicted that inflation would slow more promptly and output and employment would decline less than historical equations would forecast.
A version of this theory associated primarily with William Fellner stresses the credibility of policy in a more general way.3 In this version, what matters is that policy convincingly promises it will not tolerate inflation, quite apart from precisely how policy is conducted in the short run. The credibility hypothesis also anticipated that the change in policy regime in 1979, once widely believed, would bring down inflation more promptly and with a smaller loss of output and employment than would be predicted by empirical models fit to historical periods. And furthermore, it predicts that the coefficients relating output and inflation in the short run will change under a consistent policy, making the apparent Phillips curve steeper.
As these formulations suggest, some of the important, distinctive predictions of these alternative hypotheses could be tested only after a complete cycle of disinflation and subsequent recovery, when it would be possible to observe whether the short-run relations between output and inflation had changed and whether a new inflation norm had been established. One implication of those theories that stress expectations of policy should be testable already: they promised that a clear policy commitment to disinflation would yield better results-measured as more prompt disinflation and more disinflation relative to the increase in unemployment-than models based on past experience would predict.
In this paper, I review how the actual path of inflation during the past few years compares with the path predicted by some equations fit to historical data. I also look at some disaggregated evidence about where wage disinflation has been most pronounced and how that experience compares with the past. These comparisons should indicate whether the economic performance of this period supports the claim that the change in monetary policy initiated in 1979 has speeded up the disinflation process.
It should be noted that, if expectations are simply formed by actual experience, there is no useful distinction between the wage norm and credibility hypotheses in their predictions for the present period of disinflation. Both would then require an extended period of low actual inflation, brought about by an extended depression in economic conditions, in order to shift wage inflation downward by more than just the predicted cyclical response. There is no quantitative prediction about how large such an eventual shift down might be. If equations that rely on lagged inflation to capture long-run or expectational effects should overpredict in such a period, it would be evidence of a more favorable outcome than average past behavior would predict.
Wage Inflation
The present disinflation is first examined by looking at the behavior of wages. Because wage costs represent about two-thirds of value added in the economy, wage behavior is the main determinant of business costs and hence of the underlying trend in price inflation in most sectors of the economy. Table 2 compares the actual increases in the average hourly earnings index with the increase predicted by two closely related wage equations The difference between these adjustments, which cover major unions, and broader measures of economy-wide wage movements, such as the average hourly earnings index shown in the table, shows that the wage slowdown has been unusually great among major unions this time, with union wages in manufacturing and construction under especially great pressure. Indeed, the concentration of wage pressures is even greater than the wage adjustments reveal because of the composition of changes within all first-year adjustments. In 1982, 52 percent, and in the first half of 1983, 72 percent, of the wage adjustments in manufacturing represented either no change or a decline in wage rates. What had been a negligible phenomenon in manufacturing industries in the past became a dominant one in this recession. In the first half of 1983 an unprecedented 60 percent of wage adjustments in the construction industry showed no change or decline. credibility hypothesis in connection with the present policy of disinflation or pointing to a downward shift in inflation norms greater than historical equations would predict. Table 6 identifies the contribution of the individual independent variables to the slowdown in inflation predicted by the Gordon equations. The table shows how much inflation should have changed as a result of the independent variables taking on their actual values since 1979:4 rather than the unemployment rate staying constant at 6 percent, productivity rising at its trend rate, and all relative prices remaining unchanged. The estimates shown allow for both the direct effect on inflation of the change in each variable, and its effect acting through the lagged inflation rate which is endogenous in the projection period. By the first half of 1983 the shortfall of output below trend accounted for a slowdown in inflation of about 4 percentage points in each of the equations. This is the minimum effect that can be attributed directly to the disinflationary policy.
ECONOMY-WIDE WAGES
The effects of the three relative price variables account for an additional 2.9 to 1.6 percentage points of disinflation, depending on which equation is used. If these effects too are credited to the policy of the period, that policy has reduced the inflation rate by an estimated 6.9 to 5.6 percentage points, producing the forecast errors shown in table 5. Food and energy prices had already slowed during 1980. So almost all these relative price effects come from import prices and, when it is used, the exchange rate variable. Thus part of these anti-inflation benefits come at the expense of corresponding pro-inflationary pressures on the countries whose dollar exchange rates declined. And they are reversible if the exchange rate moves back toward its level in earlier years.
The Inflation Process and Policy
Monetary policymakers since 1979 have shown historically unusual determination to fight inflation and willingness to raise unemployment in the process. Although many issues remain, this experience has shed light on some questions about the inflationary process and the costs of disinflation. Developments have certainly not supported the central promise of some classical models that once steady disinflationary policies are in place, disinflation will take place with little output loss. The disinflation that occurred was not exceptionally prompt, and when wages finally did slow by unusually large amounts in some manufacturing industries and construction, that development was accompanied by unusually large declines in employment.
CREDIBILITY VERSUS AUSTERITY
No measure exists of what private decisionmakers thought about policy aims in this period. Because of this, one could argue that the promised benefits of credible disinflationary policy have not been realized because the credibility of anti-inflation policy has never been established. However, the Federal Reserve has certainly worked hard to establish its credibility. It persisted in its restrictive policies, implemented through money supply targets, long after its predecessors would have turned to fighting recession. And in the spring of 1983 it already moved to restrain the expansion only months after it began. The commitment to fighting inflation has been more clear and credible than ever before in the postwar era.
Ultimately determination should pay off. The evidence about the slowdown in inflation that has finally occurred in 1983 is still unclear. But in my mind, the biggest surprise will be if inflation does not slow by more than the cyclical wage equations predict. Wage norms have shifted upward in the past under sustained periods of prosperity and cyclical inflation, and they should shift downward now under the opposite, sustained condition. In the current period it is hard to distinguish this prediction from those of the credibility hypothesis if the latter require the actual experience of an extended slump to establish policy credibility. But in this case, it has no distinctive implications for policy. Only if there is an important difference between credibility and austerity is the former of any special interest.
The predictions from the Gordon-King price equation (5-3) must be interpreted differently from either of these views. That equation does not hypothesize norm shifts, but does continuously shift the short-run Phillips curve through an accelerationist lagged dependent variable. One interpretation of the equation's modest underpredictions of inflation in recent quarters-in specifications that use the full array of relative price variables, including the exchange rate-is that the high elasticity of lagged inflation exaggerates the speed and size of the reaction of actual inflation to its recent past. Alternatively, if that specification is correct, disinflation in the recent period must be interpreted as disappointingly slow. In any case, the prediction errors are not large and lend no support to the view that credible policy has speeded up the disinflation process and made it less costly.
THE LONGER RUN
Some important messages for theory and policy may not be clear until and unless policy allows a sustained recovery in economic activity. Presumably, the implicit hope in the present disinflation policy is not only that inflation might be sharply reduced, if not ended, but also that high employment might then be resumed without returning to the underlying inflation rates of the past fifteen years. All the inflation models are at least partially optimistic on this point, though for different underlying reasons. But they do offer somewhat different prospects for output and inflation in the longer run. The new classical models predict that, under the appropriate policy regime, the cyclical relation between inflation and unemployment will change and maintained full employment will be compatible with price stability. The absence thus far of the disinflation predicted by these models casts doubt on this prediction as well.
The inflation-output relation may, in fact, not be sensitive to the policy regime. As the historical studies by Gordon and by Schultze have shown, these coefficients have been surprisingly invariant to the differing policy regimes that have prevailed during this century.8 If it turns out that inflation cannot be controlled sufficiently without continually holding back expansion, then other programs for dealing more directly with inflation may have to be put back on the policy agenda.
RECENT POLICY
Whatever lessons emerge for the longer run, the decision to turn to a severely restrictive monetary policy in 1979 must be viewed against the economic risks that then existed. Energy prices were rising very rapidly in 1979 and 1980. Inflationary psychology had apparently spread to other volatile markets, and wages were accelerating. Even with the turn to restrictive policies and the recession that ensued, wages rose faster than predicted in 1980. Without that policy shift, faster inflation would almost surely have become imbedded in the economy, and very likely a still faster and more stubborn wage norm and underlying inflation rate would have resulted.
Once that acceleration was interrupted, as it was by 1981, the costs and benefits of continuing the restrictive monetary policy became more debatable. Reasonable observers can and do differ about how long and how much to depress the economy in order to reduce inflation. The results presented here suggest that we have gotten about what would have been predicted from past experience, just more of it because this recession was longer and deeper than others. 
